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Economic and monetary union (EMU) implies the acceleration of an ongoing 
process of real convergence, whereby worker productivity, income and price 
levels tend to equalise across the euro area.  Over the next 10-30 years, as real 
convergence takes place, trend inflation will be higher in poorer countries and 
lower in richer ones.  When the accession countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe join the EMU, these structural differences in inflation rates among euro 
area countries will present the European Central Bank with new challenges in 
maintaining price stability.  Three benchmark estimates for speed of real 
convergence are derived using data from Europe, the United States and Canada, 
respectively.    
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1.  Introduction  
 
The common monetary policy of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is 
formulated to address the needs of the euro area as a whole.  For individual 
member countries, however, monetary policy will often be either too loose or 
too tight, since they will from time to time experience different rates of growth 
and inflation.  At present, for example, Ireland is growing faster and 
experiencing higher inflation than Germany.  If the entire euro area were to 
resemble Ireland, monetary policy would be tighter than if the entire euro area 
looked like Germany. 
 
Such “divergences” across euro area countries are made up of two 
components: (i) cyclical, resulting from economies being at different points on 
the business cycle, and (ii) structural, resulting from underlying differences in 
the economies.  Real convergence in this paper relates to  the latter, and 
specifically to a gradual elimination of differences in economic development 
across euro area countries.  This is desirable and probably inevitable in the long 
run; total welfare will increase, and the European economy will emerge stronger 
and more vibrant than before.  Nevertheless, the process is also destabilising for 
EMU macroeconomic policy, because the larger the developmental differences 
across the euro area economies, the greater will also be the structural 
divergences in trend inflation rates. 
 
When economies integrate closely enough, developmental differences 
diminish by means of a real convergence process, whereby poorer countries 
“catch up” to richer countries in terms of per capita incomes.  Price levels 
converge as well.  This i s a long term process which affects trend inflation 
differentials.  As price levels converge in the euro area, structural inflation in the 
poorer countries will be higher, since the two levels simply cannot equalise 
without one growing faster than the other.  This causes a protracted dispersion in 
inflation rates across member countries, which cannot be addressed via 
monetary policy tools as long as the monetary policy is shared. Gradual 
convergence in living standards therefore results in a sustained divergence in 
inflation rates within the EMU. 
 
The inflationary effect of real convergence has already been well 
documented in Spain and Portugal, which have the lowest per capita GDP levels 
in the euro area.  At the time of this writing, total inflation (cyclical plus 
structural) in individual euro area countries ranges from 1.5 to 5 per cent.  When 
the EMU enlarges to include 13 more countries, many of which are a lot poorer 
than the poorest of the current euro area countries, the dispersion in structural 
inflation rates will increase.  Unless cyclical inflation converges, a wider range 
of inflation across euro area countries seems likely.  
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At the same time, the objective of the euro area common monetary policy 
is to maintain price stability.  This is defined as an annual increase in the 
harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) of less than two per cent, on 
average, over the medium term, across the entire euro area.  Since the average 
nominal inflation rate is limited to 2 per cent, any higher levels of inflation in 
euro area catching-up economies must be offset by lower levels elsewhere.  
 
This phenomenon can potentially be serious, but there are three reasons 
why it will not take policymakers by surprise.  First, EMU enlargement will not 
take place until at least two years after the EU has enlarged, and this is a process 
which may be protracted and incremental.  Second, nominal convergence of 
inflation rates is a formal prerequisite for an economy seeking to join the EMU.  
Thus, whether by tight national monetary policy or otherwise, inflation will be 
brought down and held down in accession countries before they join the euro 
area.   
 
Finally, the accession economies are still too small to carry much weight 
in the calculated euro aggregates.  Considerable catching up in living standards 
will have to take place before the weight becomes substantial.  At present, the 
combined size of the accession countries' economies is close to that of Spain; 
nevertheless, with a combined population of over 170 million people, if full 
convergence takes place, the accession countries will eventually converge to a 
weight of about one third of the euro area. 
 
All the same, it is likely that EMU will include more countries in the 
decades to come, and like Spain and Portugal today, real convergence will lead 
accession countries to have both above-average inflation and a steadily 
increasing weight in euro area inflation aggregates.  This paper assesses the size, 
speed and importance of this phenomenon.   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys recent 
literature on real convergence and takes stock of current income and price level 
differentials across euro area countries.  Sections 3, 4 and 5 gather available 
evidence on the speed of real convergence from Europe, the United States and 
Canada, respectively, in order to provide some indication of what might be 
expected in the euro area over the next two to three decades.  In all three areas, 
real convergence has taken place at a fairly rapid pace.  In the United States and 
in Canada, however, migration appears to have had an important effect in the 
convergence process, something which has been much less of a factor in Europe.  
Section 6 constructs a scenario for real convergence and draws implications for 
future trend inflation developments in the euro area.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
  
RSC 2000/52 © 2000 Nils Björksten  3
2.  Real Convergence in the EMU Today 
 
Real convergence refers to the narrowing of productivity and price level 
differentials across countries.  Broadly speaking, it occurs as a consequence of 
increased economic integration between poorer and richer countries.  With 
increased trade and technology transfer, poorer societies “catch up” to richer 




Table 1 documents very recent differences in per capita GDP across euro 
area countries.  The numbers represent per capita GDP figures as a percentage of 
euro area averages.  The figures are easily comparable, since per capita GDP is 
denominated in euros in each country.  
 
Fluctuations from 1998 to 2000 reveal which countries have been 
growing faster or more slowly than the average; numbers that grow larger each 
year indicate growth levels that are larger than the euro area average.  
Fluctuations result from both cyclical and structural factors, as well as one-time 
shocks.  Over the long run, the net effects of random shocks and cyclical factors 
should cancel out, revealing the effects of structural differences. 
 
 
Table 1.  Index of euro area per capita GDP 
  1998  1999  2000 
Luxembourg  183,8  184,0  185,5 
Austria  118,2  118,9  119,6 
Germany  117,7  116,5  116,4 
Belgium  110,6  110,2  109,8 
Finland  110,6  111,7  112,6 
France  110,1  109,2  108,9 
Netherlands  108,6  109,2  109,3 
Ireland  99,5  107,3  115,9 
Italy  89,9  89,8  89,7 
Spain  63,6  64,6  65,4 
Portugal  48,5  50,0  50,9 
  Note:  Euro11=100 in each year   
  Data source: Eurostat, NewCronos 
 
                                                                 
1 The literature sometimes makes a distinction between  b-convergence, which refers to the 
tendency of poor countries to grow faster, and  s-convergence, which is the tendency of 
sample dispersion of incomes to diminish (see e.g. Taylor, 1999).  The two concepts are 
closely related (e.g.  b-convergence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for  s-
convergence).  For the purpose of this paper there is no compelling reason to distinguish 
between the two.  
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Two key observations can be drawn from Table 1.  First, there are large 
differences in per capita GDP across the member states of the euro area.  
Second, growth in small, peripheral euro area states has been much more 
dynamic than in the large core countries.   
 
The numbers in Table 1 are not purchasing power parity (PPP) corrected.  
Comparable PPP-corrected figures show much smaller differences across euro 
area countries, e.g. figures for Portugal are around 75 (and Greece around 67).  
PPP-corrections have the drawback that they artificially inflate poorer country 
worker productivity, however, and since productivity differences are of key 
interest in examining real convergence, a comparison using PPP-corrected 
figures is less meaningful. 
 
There is some correlation between per capita income differences and price 
levels.  Table 2 shows rankings of price levels (including taxes) across EU15 
countries in 1985 and in 1997.  The information is reproduced from EC (1999), 
p. 210.  Again, there are notable differences across the euro area. 
 
 
Table 2.  EU country rankings of price levels 
  1985  1997   
Finland  130  109   
Sweden  127  120   
Denmark  124  121   
Germany  113  108   
France  109  108   
Austria  108  104   
Netherlands  103  98   
Ireland  103  96   
Belgium  101  98   
Luxembourg  98  108   
UK  98  100   
Italy  92  90   
Greece  75  80   
Spain  75  80   
Portugal  52  65   
Note:  For 1985 EU12=100 while for 1997 EU15=100 
In both tables, the interesting outliers are the poorest countries.  There are well-
established theoretical reasons for believing that trend growth and inflation in 
e.g. Portugal, Spain and Greece will continue to outpace the rest of the euro area 
in the foreseeable future, by virtue of real convergence. 
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The Mechanism for Real Convergence 
 
A driving force behind real convergence is found in the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson model for international trade, in which functioning markets and 
reasonably similar relative factor endowments will result in goods price 
equalisation and factor price equalisation, without even necessitating any 
movement of labour or capital across borders (Kim, 1997).  Allowing for cross-
border labour and/or capital flows speeds up productivity, wage and price 
convergence in an absolute sense (Razin and Yuen 1995).  Thus, closer 
economic integration alone should be enough to eventually lead to approximate 
price and wage level convergence across countries, in traded and non-traded 
sectors alike.   Increased trade in turn supports economic growth directly via 
specialisation according to the principle of comparative advantage, and 
indirectly via a diffusion of technology and best practices. 
 
A second mechanism for convergence is found in new growth theory (see 
e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995), whereby growth is determined by 
technological change.  Since imitation or copying of technology is assumed to 
be less expensive than innovation, countries that are able to imitate leaders will 
grow faster until followers and leaders have converged technologically.  Much 
empirical work on convergence has focused on this mechanism, and a brief 
overview of this literature is contained in Appendix A. 
 
There is a link between per capita GDP growth rates and price level 
increases, which is commonly referred to as the Balassa-Samuelson effect.  
Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) explained that lower price levels are 
observed in poorer countries because productivity in their tradables sector is 
lower.  Prices of traded goods (primarily manufacturing) are set on the world 
markets, while prices of nontraded goods (primarily services) are set locally.  
While productivity in nontraded sectors is similar across wealthy and poor 
countries, a less productive tradables sector i n poor countries will result in 
generally lower wages, lower non-traded goods prices, and thus also lower price 
levels.  It follows that in a given country, the price level correlates positively 




It is also true that across countries, price levels will depend on other 
things besides per capita GDP.  The price level of the US is not higher than in 
the EU, in spite of the income differential.  This is generally explained by 
                                                                 
2 Canzoneri et al (2000) have showed that compared with the EU average, several poorer EU 
countries have persistently demonstrated faster growth in traded/nontraded goods' relative 
prices and relative productivities.  These trends imply 2 -3 per cent underlying inflation 
differentials across euro area countries.   
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microeconomic factors such as efficiency and competitiveness of labour and 
product markets
3.  Exchange rate movements will also distort price level 
comparisons across time periods.  A good summary of reasons for deviation 
from the “law of one price” is contained in EC (1999).   
 
In this paper, I will take advantage of the correlation between price levels 
and per capita GDP, by studying convergence of the latter and inferring at least 
some convergence of the former.  In spite of the inaccuracies introduced, this 
indirect approach is necessary for two reasons.  First, the data on price levels is 
much less reliable than GDP data.  In Europe, national price level indices 
frequently reflect price levels observed only in national capitals, and include 
indirect taxes.  Only a few countries include adjustments to make the indices 
representative for the whole country. 
 
Second, EMU will limit the availability of some past mechanisms of 
convergence, namely widely different inflation rates followed by periodic 
currency exchange rate realignments.  At the same time, monetary integration 
will lead to greater cohesion and provide further impetus to the catching-up 
effect in living standards (see ECB 1999, p. 42).  To appreciate how real 
convergence may take place in the future, it is interesting to look at the United 
States and other monetary unions to see these have dealt with the issues of real 
convergence internally. Unfortunately, the US government does not publish 
statistics that allow for a price level comparison across regions
4. On balance, it 
therefore makes more sense to compare convergence using the national accounts 
statistics. 
 
Real Convergence Will Matter for EMU 
 
The practical implication of real convergence is that poorer euro area countries, 
such as Portugal or Spain, can expect to have a faster trend growth than richer 
euro area countries until average labour productivity and price levels are no 
longer substantially different.  Given competitive markets, this convergence 
process should continue until levels of GDP per capita are roughly the same 
throughout the euro area. 
 
                                                                 
3  For example, in Table 2 above, it is notable that the Nordic countries had very high price 
levels in the mid-1980s.  Traditionally this is explained by cartellised markets and difficulties 
in market entry due to language and transportation barriers.  The price level in high-income 
Luxembourg was similar to that of Belgium and France. 
4  The best available is a set of relative price comparisons for selected consumer goods across 
different US cities, compiled by the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association 
(ACCRA).  
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In the euro area today, even a very rapid real convergence of Portugal and 
Spain (and soon also Greece) to euro area averages is not likely to pose 
problems for the eurosystem to fulfil its inflation objective
5.  The poorest 
countries are simply not that poor relative to the average, and their weight in the 
euro area harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) is and will remain small.  
 
In the future, however, the euro area is expected to expand significantly.  
In the event that in the coming decades the euro area includes an additional 170 
million people (the current population of Central and Eastern European 
accession countries + Turkey), the price stability objective may become more 
complicated to implement.  For this reason, assessing the speed of real 
convergence is important for all parties concerned, not just Portugal, Spain and 
Greece. It is ironic that the process of convergence between integrated trading 
partners implies a period of divergence in structural inflation.  Unless policy and 
institutional structures are made sufficiently flexible, this divergence may be 




In the sections that  follow, I examine historical evidence on real 
convergence in Europe and North America for the sole purpose of deriving 
implications for a common monetary policy in a diverse but converging euro 
area.  For this reason, and in contrast with most academic research on 
convergence
7, I make no assumptions with regard to either future long-run 
aggregate growth rates or hypothetical steady-states of individual countries.  
Neither do I attempt to quantify the relative importance of different alternative 
mechanisms driving convergence, since available monetary policy variables do 
not include adjusting the speed of trade and capital market liberalisation, 
slowing the spread of technology, restricting worker migration, etc.  Such 
endeavours are left to future research. 
 
 
                                                                 
5 The weights of Portugal and Spain in the euro area HICP statistic are currently 1.8 and 9.1 
per cent, respectively.  Thus, the ECB price stability objective can technically be fulfilled 
even with an explosive 10 per cent inflation in these two countries, as long as the inflation in 
the rest of the euro area is below 0.91 per cent. 
6  In theory, this divergence in structural inflation can be compensated for by offsetting 
divergences in cyclical inflation.  In practice, it would be reckless for policymakers to rely on 
this possibility.  
7 The standard approach of convergence studies is to test the fit and estimate the parameters of 
existing growth models in assorted permutations.  These models were designed to explain 
long-run growth, and thus always include assumptions of steady states and (endogenous or 
exogenous) technological innovation.  Convergence only happens to be an incidental 
implication which is well borne out by the data.    
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3.  Case Evidence: Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Spain after Joining the 
EU 
 
In recent decades, Western Europe has seen a considerable increase in economic 
integration.  At the same time, poorer European countries have seen their 
average living standards rise dramatically toward the average for the region.  
These developments are shown graphically in Chart 1, which demonstrates how 
real convergence has taken place within the EU framework during the period 
1970-1997.  On the vertical axis is the per capita GDP of the current 15 
members of the European Union, with the EU15-wide average normalised to 
100.  On the horizontal axis is the cumulative population of the countries.  The 
countries are ordered by per capita GDP, from highest to lowest.  All data in this 
section are from OECD sources. 
 
Comparing the two panels in Chart 1, since 1970 there has been a 
tendency for convergence towards the mean.  By and large, the poorer countries 
have tended to catch up with the average, and the richer countries have reduced 
their lead, thus making for the flatter distribution in 1997, shown in Panel B.  
Here it is worth noting that the poorest EU countries (Greece, Spain and 
Portugal) all joined the EU in the 1980s.  In the case of Spain and Portugal, a 
sustained and rapid catching-up process did not start until the time of their EU 
accession in 1986, and Greece has only been converging since 1988.   
 
The trend real convergence phenomenon is equally evident when we 
observe the time series data of per capita GDP in the EU15, as shown in Chart 2.  
For simplicity of exposition, only the minimum and maximum of the time series 
are shown.  A closer look at the data reveals a broad trend of convergence for 
practically all countries that in 1970 were outside of the GDP per capita range of 
80-120 per cent of the EU15 level (the exception being Denmark).  
 
This development is exactly what is predicted by basic trade theory (see 
e.g. Leamer and Levinsohn, 1994), given closer economic integration between 
European countries.  Investment would be expected to flow from richer 
countries toward poorer countries, where improvements in technology would 
allow rapid increases in productivity.  In the first instance, this results in higher 
industrial wages and faster economic growth in the poorer countries.  Secondary 
effects include a faster rise in service sector wages and prices (the so-called 
Balassa-Samuelson effect, which is described in a European context in e.g. 
Alberola and Tyrväinen 1998, Tyrväinen 1998 and ECB 1999), and a broad-
based increase in the price level toward what exists in the richer trading partners.  
A catching-up country will therefore experience faster trend inflation than 
wealthier countries.  
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Data source:  OECD 
 
 
For policymakers today, two questions immediately arise out of the empirical 
observations in Charts 1 and 2: 
 
•  How fast is this real convergence process, and the associated 
differential in trend inflation between wealthy and poorer euro area 
countries? 
 
•  Does the convergence process slow down as differentials 
decline, or is the speed relatively constant regardless of the size of 
per capita GDP differentials? 
 
To help answer these questions, I gathered per capita GDP data from 18 
European countries
8 indexed i = 1..18 over the time period j = 1970-97, and ran 
the following panel regression: 
 
  i i i ij EU GAP DGAP ) 1 ( ) 1 ( - + - + = g b a  
where 
 
                                                                 
8 The EU15 plus Norway, Switzerland and Iceland.  Data source:  OECD  
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DGAPi   = the annual  change in the gap between country i's per capita GDP 
level and the EU15 average per capita GDP level (GAPt-GAPt-1) 
GAP(-1)I  = the absolute size of the gap between country i's per capita GDP 
level and the EU15 average per capita GDP level, lagged 1 period 
EU(-1)i  = a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for years during 
which country i was a member of the EU 
 
Parameters for the variables were estimated using the entire set of 486 
observations, but country-specific effects (including different political 
environments, institutional setups, etc) are taken into account by having separate 
intercept terms for each country
9.  The method used was GLS with cross section 
weights and calculating White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariance. The regression results are shown in Table 3 below. The full 
regression results, including coefficients for fixed effects, is described and 




Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
GAP(-1)  -0.121075  0.019782  -6.120363  0.0000 
EU(-1)  1.061899  0.227794  4.661674  0.0000 
         
Log likelihood  -1175       
R-squared  0.085    DW-Stat   1.49 
 
 
As expected, the regression was highly significant, with a large income gap 
being a very good explanatory variable for convergence toward the mean; all 
else equal, a 1 percentage point larger gap implies a 0.12  percentage point 
greater reduction in the gap in the following year. The force for convergence in 
nominal per capita GDP levels thus appears to be very strong.  This convergence 
can be divided into real output per capita growth differentials and changes in 
relative price levels, of which the latter are composed of both trend and cyclical 
inflation.  Over the time period in question, the differences in real growth rates 
have been significant but much smaller than what is indicated by the regression.  
                                                                 
9 De la Fuente (1997) notes the importance of including preference and policy parameters in 
the regression along with social, political, demographic and institutional variables.  
Unfortunately, a lack of data means that such variables are invariably left out in empirical 
estimations.  The second-best approach  is to catch them by including fixed effects in the way 
that I have.  Care must then be exercised not to over-interpret the resulting intercept terms, 
which include a complicated mish-mash of unquantifiables.  Moreover, in the European case, 
the political,  social and institutional variables are likely to converge over time, though at a 
speed which is anyone's guess.  In my regression I have therefore decided not to give an 
economic interpretation to the country-specific constants.  
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It follows that a large part of the convergence has involved real 
appreciation/depreciation.  In particular, the trend inflation differential could 
amount to several percentage points per year for the euro area countries with the 
lowest per capita GDP. 
 
As far as the control variable was concerned, the fact of having become an 
EU member did seem to matter with regard to convergence.  This supports the 
anecdotal evidence of Portugal and Spain starting a sustained convergence 
process toward the EU average only after becoming EU members.  Intuitively, 
closer integration seems to have facilitated the convergence process.  A 
plausible mechanism for this is the adoption of common EU institutions, which 
may have resulted in increasing competitiveness and/or larger investment 
inflows.  Another factor may be EU support for infrastructure projects, etc. 
 
On a year to year basis, the regression explains less than nine per cent of 
annual fluctuations in DGAP.  Presumably this is because in the short term, 
cyclical factors and economic shocks of various types tend to swamp the long-
term trend effects of real convergence.  Nevertheless, the strong significance of 
the regression indicates that over the longer term, there is indeed a strong trend 
component for convergence in the poorer EU member countries.  This supports 
the validity of the graphical evidence of convergence that is provided in Charts 1 
and 2.  
 
The estimated speed of convergence is considerably higher than the 2 per 
cent per year standard estimates obtained in the literature using cross-sectional 
methods, but is on a par with other estimates obtained using panel data, such as 
those of Canova and Marcet (1995) or Funcke and Strulik (1999).  As those 
authors have pointed out, using panel estimation techniques is a more efficient 
use of the available data than aggregating growth rates over the sample period 
and running a cross-section regression with only one observation per country.  
Moreover, the method allows for the introduction of fixed effects, as I have 
done, to capture systematic but unmeasurable differences across countries, the 
current and historical existence of which is really beyond any reasonable doubt.   
 
Interpreting the speed of real convergence from this regression is not 
straightforward, however.  Strictly speaking, the regression tells us that each 
country is rapidly converging towards its own particular hypothetical steady-
state, which may differ across countries and change over time (see Quah 
1993ab, Canova and Marcet 1995).  It seems plausible, however, that country-
specific long-run steady-states are themselves converging over time within the 
economic and monetary union, and that they are closer to each other today than 
they were three decades ago.  European integration has contributed to 
harmonised i nstitutional practices and greater competitiveness in retail markets,  
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and this process is by no means complete
10.  From observing the data, I would 
expect the steady states of the Euro area countries' per capita GDP levels today 
to easily be within 20 percentage points of the euro area average, and closing.  
 
Drawing implications for the convergence in price levels involves adding 
another layer of uncertainty.  While there is an established link between price 
levels and per capita GDP via the Balassa-Samuelson mechanism, the country-
specific price levels are bound to be affected downwards in varying degrees by 
the improvements in labour and product markets that are being introduced in the 
wake of the common currency.  Moreover, the leeway of adjustment in price 
levels has been constrained for several years already as EU countries have 
pursued Maastricht criteria-related disinflationary programmes.  Under the 
common currency arrangement, these constraints will persist into the future, and 
may impose a cost on the future growth rates of catching-up countries. 
 
 
4.  Case Evidence: United States Real Convergence between Major Regions 
 
Studies of economic integration on international incomes are complemented by 
studies of  domestic integration on regional incomes (see R azin and Yuen, 
1995).  After correcting for differences in political regimes and macroeconomic 
policies, the effects of economic integration is fundamentally similar whether 
we are examining nations or regions.  Thus, we gain valuable insight into the 
future path of European economies by examining long-run trends in US regional 
developments, where a common currency prevails, along with common 
institutions, highly integrated labour and product markets, and a system of fiscal 
federalism. 
 
Existing studies document strong evidence of economic convergence in 
the United States. Over long samples, holding constant the region and measures 
of sectoral composition, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) find that the speed of 
convergence is roughly 2 per cent per year regardless of the time period or 
whether the converging variable is personal income or gross state product.  The 
results were the same using data on both on personal income 1929-1988
11 and 
gross state product 1963-1986.  Likewise, Kim (1997) and Caselli and Coleman 




                                                                 
10 For further discussion of this, see Appendix B. 
11 Supplementary data is also used for various subsets of the region, in some cases going all 
the way back to 1840. 
12  Kim, Caselli and Coleman are actually more interested in determining the mechanism of 
convergence, which they find i n trade theory as opposed to growth theory as in Barro's work.  
As a result, Kim is also able to explain the divergence that took place in US regional per  
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These findings are replicated below.  Chart 3 Panels A and B show 
snapshot pictures of the income distribution across eight major regions of the 
United States, in 1950 and in 1998, respectively.  All data are from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce.  Once again, during the 
time period there appears to have been a convergence towards the mean, with 
few changes in the ordering by income of the regions. 
 
Two observations are immediately apparent from Chart 3.  First, with 
practically all regions within ten per cent of the average in 1998, the differences 
across US regions are not as large as are the differences across Europe.  In 
observing the development record of the United States, it is encouraging that on 
average and across large units, large differences in per capita income tend to 
disappear, and the poorest regions in particular catch up toward the average.   
 
Second, it is equally apparent that in contrast to Europe, there are 
significant effects of migration at play.  The United States has as a whole 
experienced substantial population growth, which has not been evenly 
distributed across the eight major regions.  In part this reflects large positive net 
immigration during most if not all years.  Presumably there has also been 
considerably more migration across regions in the United States as compared to 
migration across countries in Europe.  It is therefore possible that income 
convergence i s partly explained by changes in population, with relatively poorer 
persons relocating to relatively wealthier areas to live and work. 
 
To formally test income convergence in the United States, I ran a second 
panel regression as follows: 
 
  i i i ij LPOP GAP DGAP ) 1 ( ) 1 ( - + - + = g b a  
where 
 
DGAPi   = the annual change in the gap between region i's per capita income 
level and the US average per capita income level (GAPt-GAPt-1) 
GAP(-1)i  = the absolute size of the gap between region i's per capita income 
level and the US average per capita income level, lagged 1 period 
LPOPi(-1)  = the log of population in region i, lagged one period. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
capita income during the 19
th century, while Caselli and Coleman explain the observed 
structural transformation out of agriculture and into manufacturing/services.  
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Parameters for the variables were estimated using the entire set of 232 
observations, but region-specific effects (including different industrial 
structures, demographics, etc) are taken into account by having separate 
intercept terms for each region.  The estimation is GLS with fixed effects and 




Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
GAP(-1)  -0.0446  0.0176  -2.537  0.012 
LPOP(-1)  -1.2496  0.4630  -2.699  0.008 
         
R-squared  0.178     
Log likelihood  -241.374      F-statistic  48.12 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.322      Prob(F-statistic)  0.000 
 Data source: US Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
Once again, the regression was highly significant, with a large income gap being 
a very good explanatory variable for convergence toward the mean.  This time, 
however, the parameter was not as large; all else equal, a 1 percentage point 
larger gap implies less than a 0.05 percentage point greater reduction in the gap 
in the following year.  This estimate is not incompatible with the 2 per cent 
convergence rate found by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
 
Much of the convergence may in fact have been driven by migration 
effects, however. In the regression above, regional population growth was a 
highly significant explanatory variable for convergence, with a large and 
negative coefficient.  This can be e xplained in three ways.  First, as relatively 
poor people immigrate into the United States from abroad, they tend to settle in 
relatively wealthier regions such as New York and California, which brings 
these areas closer to the average.  Second, internal migration occurs across the 
regions of the United States, as wage-earners pursue more attractive income 
opportunities in other parts of the country.  If this group of native migrants 
consists mostly of persons earning below average (such as young persons, 
unemployed or underemployed), generally moving to faster-growing, wealthier 
areas, the net effect is to increase average income in the area where they leave 
and decrease average income where they take up residence.  Third, a similar 
effect occurs as wealthy retirees from other parts of the United States take up 
residence in places such as Florida, a development that has boomed since the 
proliferation of air conditioning and the dramatic increase in the number of 
wealthy retirees. The available data does not allow for a differentiation between 
the three effects.   
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On a year to year basis, the regression explains close to 18 per cent of 
annual fluctuations in DGAP, which is considerably more than in the European 
case.  Presumably this is because there are no s hort term exchange rate 
fluctuations to swamp the long-term trend effects of real convergence.  As 
before, the strong significance of the regression indicates that over the longer 
term, there is a strong trend component for convergence in the poorer regions of 
the United States.  This confirms the validity of the graphical evidence of 
convergence that is provided in Chart 3.  
 
The US example poses two large drawbacks in drawing lessons for 
prospective real convergence in Europe.  First, while the existence  of real 
convergence seems practically incontestible, the mechanism for this 
convergence may in large part involve migration, and is therefore different from 
what has been the case in Europe and will probably continue to be the case for 
some time.  While other mechanisms certainly played a role as well, we simply 




Second, the income differences across US regions are proportionally 
much smaller than the differences will be within the enlarged euro area of 2010.  
If we accept that equilibrium “full convergence” most likely will still imply 
differences in average per capita income across regions of plus minus ten per 
cent or so, the US regions are by and large very close to full convergence today.  
Under these circumstances, it is unreliable to extrapolate small movements in 
the data to draw implications for speed of convergence when gaps are on the 
order of 50 percentage points or more. 
 
5.  Case Evidence: Canadian Real Convergence between Provinces   
 
The Canadian experience also differs from EU experience by virtue of a 
common currency and significant net immigration from abroad, but is similar in 
terms of having multiple national languages and lower internal labour  mobility 
than in the US.  A priori, therefore, one might expect Canada to present an 
intermediate case between Europe and the United States. 
 
Again, convergence is readily apparent (see Chart 4).  In fact, it is quite 
striking how large the divergences were as recently as 1961, and how much the 
provinces have converged since then.  Nonetheless, the dramatic (over 50 per 
cent) increase in population between 1961 and 1998 suggests that in Canada as 
                                                                 
13 Razin and Yuen (1995) hypothesise that growth rate convergence is driven by capital 
mobility and income level convergence by labour mobility.  Their evidence for this 
hypothesis is weak, however, and the hypothesis is also not supported by the observed real 
convergence in Europe.  
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well, migration probably played some role in the convergence.  As in the United 
States, immigration to Canada has not been evenly distributed across all 
provinces.     
 
To formally test the existence and mechanisms of real convergence across 
the Canadian provinces, a regression was run which was very similar to that for 
the United States above: 
   
  i i i ij LPOP GAP DGAP ) 1 ( ) 1 ( - + - + = g b a  
where 
 
DGAPi   = the annual change in the gap between province i's income level 
and the average income level for Canada (GAPt-GAPt-1) 
GAP(-1)i  = the absolute size of the gap between province i's income level and 
the average income level for Canada, lagged 1 period 
LPOPi(-1)  = the log of population in province i, lagged one period. 
 
Statistics Canada compiles data by province on both per capita income 
and on output.  The regression was run on both sets of data, and yielded very 
similar results in both cases
14.  Table 5 reports results using annual personal 
income data across Canadian provinces 1962-1998; that is, 37 observations each 
for 10 provinces with a balanced panel of data including 370 observations
15. 
                                                                 
14 The size and statistical significance of the tabulated regression coefficients were virtually 
the same.  Differences were by and large relegated to the province-specific fixed effects, 
which were all close to -5 in the income regression and 0 in the output regression. 
15 The Canadian data contained two relatively minor discontinuities: a methodological change 
in provincial vs. aggregate Canadian data compilation (whereby provincial and Canadian data 
are only fully reconciled from 1992 onward) and the splitting in two of a Canadian territory 
mid-period (into Yukon and Northwest Territories, with a combined population of well under 
100,000).  
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RSC 2000/52 © 2000 Nils Björksten  20
The method used is GLS with cross section weights, and White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance.  
 
Table 5 
Canadian personal income data 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
GAP(-1)  -0.059  0.0122  -4.85  0.0000 
LPOP(-1)  0.347  0.3111  1.12  0.2650 
         
R-squared  0.074          F-statistic      28.747 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.82     
 Data source:  Statistics Canada 
 
The coefficient on GAP again had the expected size and magnitude, and was 
statistically significant with over 99 per cent confidence.  Real convergence thus 
appears to have been a fact in Canada as well, with convergence proceeding at a 
pace that is faster than in the US but nevertheless slower than in Europe.  
 
As far as the mechanisms driving this convergence, however, the role of 
migration is less clear, since province-specific population growth was not a 
statistically significant explanatory variable in the regression.  While the sheer 
scale of immigration into Canada makes it a variable that cannot be ignored, no 
reliable conclusions can be drawn about it without better descriptive statistics of 
the population flows in question.    
 
 
6.  Implications for Euro Area Inflation 
 
Trend inflation depends in  part on the pace of aggregate price level 
convergence.  Over time, lower aggregate price levels in poorer euro area 
countries are catching up to the higher levels found in richer countries, and this 
catch-up creates a component of inflation. 
 
To assess the impact of this phenomenon on euro area inflation, I 
conducted a simulation involving a faster-growing Spain, Portugal and Greece.  
Assuming that these three countries (i) all experience annual real growth and 
inflation averaging 3 per cent each, (ii) while real growth in the rest of the euro 
area averages 2 per cent annually, then the faster-growing countries' real per 
capita GDP would still only be about 85 per cent of the euro area average by 
2040.  In the i nterim, however, price stability requires that  average inflation in 
the rest of the euro area would have to be maintained at ever lower levels, as the 
weight of the faster-growing part of the euro area gradually increases.   
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Maximum inflation in the Euro-9 would be almost 1.9 now and gradually fall to 
about 1.8.  This does not seem to be an insurmountable obstacle, and the 
European Central Bank is probably right not to be concerned (ECB 1999)
16. 
 
The enlargement process looks to be more problematic, however.  Besides 
the poorer euro area countries, there are 13 official candidates for accession to 
the EU, most of them substantially poorer than the euro area average (see 
European Central Bank, 2000).  Based on the historical evidence of real 
convergence presented in sections 3 -5 above, the accession countries to the 
European Union should, in time, boast per capita income levels on a par with 
those of the current Euro area members.  As price levels converge across 
countries, there will, on average, also be a positive inflation differential between 
the EU accession countries and the current euro area.  This differential will 
persist until price levels have converged. 
 
The size of this inflation differential depends on how fast real 
convergence actually takes place, and there are few serious estimates of this.  A 
lower bound is given by Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1998), who project a 5-6 per 
cent long term trend growth rate of per capita GDP, on average, in the transition 
economies.  The reason that this can be considered a lower bound is because the 
authors use a  Barro-type growth regression without fixed effects, which 
statistically biases downward the convergence rate estimates (see Canova and 
Marcet, 1995). The authors also obtain similar results using an alternative 
(Levine-Renelt, 1992) growth regression specification, which suffers from the 
same bias.  By contrast, the panel-type estimation benchmarks in sections 3-5 
above suggest that growth may well be substantially higher.  In the extreme, a 
case can be made for sustained double-digit growth rates, once well-functioning 
EU-type institutional structures of a market economy have successfully been put 
into place.  Such growth rates have already been observed in e.g. Estonia, 
although they were interrupted by the outbreak of the Russian crisis and a 
subsequent capital withdrawal from emerging markets in general. 
 
On a technical note, caution must be taken in interpreting current inflation 
and real convergence statistics in the accession countries.  For inflation in non 
euro area countries, Eurostat currently uses consumer spending weights at PPP 
exchange rates.  This procedure inflates the relative size and average labour 
productivity of the accession countries, and therefore underestimates the real 
extent of price level increases from year to year.  Thus, a poor country which 
shows pre-accession inflation rates that conform to the Maastrict criteria may, 
upon accession, show a much higher inflation rate merely because inflation 
                                                                 
16   This is not meant to imply that underlying inflation differentials of 2-3 per cent are safely 
ignored.  Canzoneri et al (2000) present several arguments why EMU policymakers should be 
concerned.  
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calculations are now based on actual price increases rather than adjusted by 
purchasing power parity. 
 
Looking forward to the years 2010 and 2020, one might ask how catching 
up would affect inflation developments in the euro area.  Assuming that real 
convergence takes place along the patterns that have historically been observed, 
the impact on euro area inflation and subsequently monetary policy will depend 
on the rate and circumstances of the coming accession process -- who is actually 
counted into the average, and what weight they are given.  The more rapid and 
large scale the accession process, the greater will be the impact on the common 
monetary policy. 
 
Chart 5 presents in one graph the EU15 countries and the 13 accession 
countries, in descending order of per capita GDP.  The dispersion in per capita 
incomes increases when all countries are taken into account, and indeed the 
average itself falls by over 25 per cent.  Real convergence will take place both 
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before and after the EMU accession of the individual countries at the lower end 
of the distribution, but euro area inflation statistics will not be affected until after 
accession has taken place and the countries are included in the averages. A net 
effect of real convergence on euro area aggregate inflation can therefore only be 
estimated after having arrived at a belief about both the accession timetable and 
the size of the inflation differential between richer and poorer euro area 
countries.  In calculating average inflation for the euro area, individual country 
inflation is weighted by country GDP denominated in euros.  Thus, the weights 
of accession country inflation developments will eventually also be determined 
by the size of their GDP in euros.  In 1998, the combined GDP of all of the 
accession countries was quite small, amounting to less than 9 per cent of the 
euro area combined GDP, or smaller than Spain alone. 
 
Seen from this perspective, one might conclude that the accession 
countries' catching up will only have a similarly small effect on euro area 
inflation.  This conclusion is mistaken: as real convergence progresses, the 
weight in the euro aggregates of the accession countries converges toward their 
share in euro area population, which is well over one third.  To illustrate this, I 
conducted a second simulation that assumed (i) EMU accession of the 13 
countries above within 15 years, (ii) average real growth of 2 per cent in 
wealthier countries, and (ii) average real growth and inflation of 5 per cent each 
in accession countries until 2010, with 2010-2015 inflation averaging 4 per cent, 
declining to 3 per cent thereafter.  Between 2010 and 2015, the simulation 
showed wealthier euro area countries obliged to maintain average annual 
inflation levels below 1.25 per cent.  After 20 years of convergence, per capita 
GDP in accession countries would still only be about 66 per cent of the euro 
area average.  Spain, Portugal and Greece would have caught up by this time, 
however, and would therefore no longer exert an upward pull on inflation.  
Inflation in the nine wealthiest euro area countries could then return to close to 
1.6 per cent, but would again have to fall as the weight of the accession 
countries increased further.  The catching-up process nears completion by 2030, 
after which the related inflation differential is assumed to disappear.  The 
simulation did not take into account a ny eventual changes to relative positions 
on the business cycle. 
 
 
7.  Conclusions  
 
As the economic and monetary union (EMU) enlarges to include the 13 
accession countries, there will be a greater dispersion of per capita income levels 
across the euro area.  These differences will tend to diminish over a period of 
20-30 years.  During this process, however, trend inflation will be higher in the 
“catching-up” countries.  Once the new countries join EMU, relatively wealthy  
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member countries will have to have lower inflation in order for euro area price 
stability to be maintained on average.  The situation will be similar to what has 
already been observed with regard to Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece, but on 
a larger scale, due to the greater differences in average living standards.  
 
Regarding the predicted speed of convergence, the available estimates 
range from 2 per cent per year to over 10 per cent.  This paper has developed 
three benchmark estimates for how fast real convergence may take place, using 
data from Europe, the United States and Canada, respectively.  In all three 
places, real convergence has been the rule.  Nevertheless, the mechanisms for 
convergence appear to have differed.  Migration was probably a more important 
element in both the United States and Canada, whereas European convergence 
has relied more on trade and investment flows and a proliferation of best 
practices in institutional design.  Perhaps consequently, the differences today 
remain much larger between the average per capita income levels of various 
euro area countries.  While migration may yet become an important force for 
real convergence in the enlarged euro area as well, the best benchmark for what 
the future will contain for Europe may still be that derived from Europe itself 
over the past thirty years.  As always, however, the limitations must be 
recognised of using Western Europe in the past to predict Central European and 
Balkan developments in the future, especially as EMU also imposes changes to 
the real convergence process as it has occurred in the past.  
 
When studying the EU accession countries, it must be kept in mind that 
many of them are still in various stages of systemic and institutional 
transformation to market economies.  Until this process has progressed further, 
the macroeconomies remain fragile and sustained very rapid growth will be 
difficult to accommodate.  This will slow the average pace of real convergence 
during the next several years.  Real convergence may thus take hold with full 
force at about the time when the accession countries are expected to be joining 
the euro area, and become subject to the common monetary policy.   
 
On the positive side, the very fact that accession countries are adopting 
EU institutions is almost certainly a facilitating factor to real convergence in 
living standards.  Current popular conventional wisdom holds that without the 
presence of the EU, the central European transition economies would not have 
progressed nearly as far in the past decade, and would not be nearly as clear on 
the direction in which they were developing. 
 
Two reasons were identified why real convergence in the enlarged euro 
area will not immediately cause problems for the common monetary policy.   
First, the economic weight of the accession countries relative to the rest of the 
euro area is still small enough that any inflation divergences will only have a  
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negligible impact on the euro area as a whole.  Eventually, however, the 
convergence of living standards will cause the economic weight of this group of 
countries to converge toward its share of population, which is around one third 
of an enlarged euro area.   
 
The second reason is that EMU accession criteria will compel the 
countries in question to bring inflation rates into line before they can join the 
euro area.  It is one thing to achieve nominal convergence, but quite a different 
one to sustain it in the face of large differences in living standards.  Prior to 
joining EMU, it is possible to use tight monetary policy to achieve low inflation 
for a requisite two-year qualifying period.  After that, the monetary policy tool is 
no longer available and real convergence may proceed once more.  An economic 
policy strategy whereby real convergence would not be allowed to proceed 
would probably be difficult for a local constituency to accept. 
 
Many poor countries have recently witnessed dramatic successes in 
lowering inflation to single-digit levels, but real convergence of living standards 
is making it very difficult for them to sustain inflation levels below 2 per cent 
over the medium term.  Given an ongoing process of economic integration, as 
trade expands and improved technology/best practices proliferate, such low 
inflation levels may in some cases only be compatible with conditions of a 
cyclical recession, where real convergence has artificially been stopped.  This 
seems to be the case at present in the Czech Republic and in all three of the 
Baltic states (See ECB Monthly Bulletin, February 2000, Table 2 p. 41). 
 
For accession countries, then, it may be counterproductive to achieve 
nominal parity in inflation early on.  Joining the EU does not preclude the 
existence of substantial inflation differentials.  Inflation may be brought down to 
single digits, but should probably still remain somewhat over the euro area 
average in order for real convergence in living standards and price levels to take 
place.  Just how high nominal inflation should be will depend on country-
specific circumstances related to catching up at a sustainable pace.   
 
After EU accession has taken place, the subsequent accession process to 
EMU requires a decision by EU Heads of State.  Recommendations will then be 
considered from both the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank.  One important component of such recommendations is bound to be the 
sustainable nature of an accession country having met the inflation criteria of the 
Maastricht Treaty.  Due to real convergence considerations, this could become a 
critical sticking point.  At the same time, economic judgements on this point will 
necessarily be subjective.  In the final analysis, political factors will also have to 
be considered. 
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Institutionally, it must be kept in mind that the European Central Bank has 
essentially no room for manoeuvre in order to reconcile the common monetary 
policy with differing inflation developments within the euro area.  It is up to 
national policymakers to keep growth in their economies stable and balanced.  
The task of managing EMU enlargement in a sustainable and non-disruptive 
way must therefore lie in the preparatory work of economic policymakers in the 
countries themselves, as post-enlargement economic strategies are prepared. 
 
To do this, a fuller assessment is needed with regard to the likely 
mechanisms for real convergence.  If convergence takes place primarily through 
trade and investment flows, policies and institutions need to focus on increasing 
the amount of investment that can effectively be absorbed by the accession 
countries without precipitating macroeconomic overheating.  If the convergence 
mechanism also involves substantial migration within and between European 
countries, a policy and institutional response is needed to manage these flows as 
well.  Finally, the timing and conditions for EMU accession must take into 
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Appendix A:  Convergence According to the New Growth Theory 
 
The so-called “convergence property” of the neoclassical growth model, as 
developed by Solow (1956) and others, states that once corrections have been 
made for relevant differences across economies, then a lower starting level of 
real per capita GDP implies a higher predicted growth rate.  A lot of empirical 
support exists for the conditional convergence property of various versions of 
the Solow model, and good discussions of this are contained in e.g. Murthy and 
Chien (1997), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995) and Bernard and Durlauf 
(1994).  Indeed, empirical work on convergence has recently concentrated on 
this mechanism, while convergence results that derive from trade theory have by 
and large been incidental
17. 
 
As Barro (1996) points out, the convergence property derives from 
diminishing returns to capital (including human capital); economies with less 
capital per worker thus have higher marginal product of capital than capital-rich 
countries.  With free movement of capital, capital will flow toward countries 
where it is relatively scarce until marginal products of capital have been 
equalised.  Even without free capital flows, an equal propensity to save and 
invest in each country will in time result in convergence, as capital-poor 
countries grow faster.  Nevertheless, there are many reasons why cross-country 
variation can arise and persist, including differing government policy 
environments and market distortions. 
 
In a cross-country study of 100 countries from 1960 to 1990, Barro (1996) 
finds strong support for the convergence property above.  Nevertheless, the devil 
is clearly in the details of how best to correct for differences in variables that are 
hard to quantify, such as schooling, political stability or the quality of 
government policies and institutions.  When forecasting relative growth rates, 
one  is also making implicit statements about economies' relative current and 
future performances.  To do this reliably enough for policymaking purposes, it 
becomes essential to have a detailed and sophisticated knowledge of the 
structure of the economies.  Barro-type regression estimates should therefore not 
be taken as more than a starting point for further discussion.  This point is driven 
home by Table 4 in Barro (1996), which tabulates winners and losers for 
prospective economic growth 1996-2000.  Big winners include South Korea, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Hong Kong, countries that were severely hit by the 
Asian crisis shortly after the publication of the forecasts. 
 
Canova and Marcet (1995) have questioned the adequacy of this 
mechanism in fully explaining convergence.  Using panel data, the authors 
                                                                 
17 A survey is contained in Leamer and Levinsohn (1994).  
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estimate a Bayesian model and introduce fixed effects to control for systematic 
differences across countries.  The result is convergence estimates that are far too 
high to plausibly be explained using the neoclassical model.  De la Fuente (1997 
pp. 68-69) uses these results to open a discussion of the respective mechanisms 
of convergence.  In particular, he cites evidence that contradicts what he calls 
the “prevailing view” that income convergence is mainly the result of decreasing 
returns to scale in reproducible factors.  Instead, he suggests technological 
diffusion, factor flows and changes in the sectoral composition of output as 
important explanations.  The results in this paper provide additional evidence 
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Appendix B:  Robustness tests on European data regressions 
 
 
1.  Basic case, common intercept 
  
     
Dependent Variable: DGAP_?  Method: Pooled Least 
Squares 
   
Sample: 1971 1997    Included observations: 
27 
   
Total panel (balanced) observations 486       
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & 
Covariance 
   
         
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
C  0.373673  0.242763  1.539249  0.1244 
GAP_?(-1)  -0.016978  0.008023  -2.116264  0.0348 
         
R-squared  0.010861      Mean dependent var  0.165898 
Adjusted R-squared  0.008817      S.D. dependent var  6.636847 
S.E. of regression  6.607522      Sum squared resid  21131.13 
Log likelihood  -1237.372      F-statistic    5.314502 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.733046      Prob(F-statistic)    0.021571 
 
 
Discussion:  This regression corresponds to the most basic test of absolute 
convergence; without conditioning for any systematic differences in 
characteristics of individual countries, it is tested whether there exists a tendency 
for an economy to converge toward the mean per capita GDP.  The coefficient 
for GAP(-1) is negative and significant, and of the same order as is generally 
found in Barro-type regressions in various permutations.  The regression itself 
has a very low explanatory power, but is statistically significant. 
 
Nonetheless, this regression ignores the fact that there are systematic 
differences between European countries (via different institutions, industrial 
structures, cultural habits, etc).  Including measures of all these differences 
would significantly improve the fit of the regression.  Unfortunately, the nature 
of these differences make them very hard to control for (witness the efforts and 
discussions of Barro, 1996 and Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).  Therefore, a 
second-best way of approaching this problem is to include fixed effects in the 
regression, as was done in the paper and tabulated in Table 3.  This explicitly 
acknowledges a systematic pattern in the error term of the regression above, and 
thus improves the fit.  Below is a more detailed discussion of this methodology. 
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2.  Full regression from Table 3, including fixed effects' coefficients 
Dependent Variable: DGAP_?     
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights)   
Sample: 1971 1997       
Included observations: 27     
Total panel (balanced) observations 486   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
         
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
GAP_?(-1)  -0.121075  0.019782  -6.120363  0.0000 
EU_?(-1)  1.061899  0.227794  4.661674  0.0000 
         
SWI—C  10.25266  2.751493     
NOR—C  7.738734  2.131593     
ICE—C  5.652239  5.347870     
LUX—C  5.615727  2.439420     
DK—C  4.819563  1.158631     
SWE—C  3.803700  2.295160     
FIN—C  2.218859  2.619896     
AT—C  2.187712  0.377387     
GER—C  1.373723  0.624011     
FRA—C  0.912067  0.517578     
NE—C  0.776164  0.634666     
BEL—C  0.638973  0.614877     
UK—C  -1.916333  0.977525     
IT—C  -2.298480  0.602283     
IRL—C  -3.724774  0.937907     
SPA—C  -4.893109  0.871826     
GRE—C  -6.713764  1.007507     
POR—C  -7.720137  1.289944     
         
Weighted Statistics       
         
R-squared  0.084929      Mean dependent var  0.293457 
Adjusted R-squared  0.047619      S.D. dependent var  6.538210 
S.E. of regression  6.380640      Sum squared resid  18972.06 
Log likelihood  -1175.034      F-statistic  2.276309 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.489156      Prob(F-statistic)  0.001715 
         
Unweighted Statistics     
         
R-squared  0.093352      Mean dependent var  0.165898 
Adjusted R-squared  0.056385      S.D. dependent var  6.636847 
S.E. of regression  6.447021      Sum squared resid  19368.86 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.709992       
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Discussion:  This regression conditions convergence on the existence of 
systematic differences across countries.  Nevertheless, these differences are 
never made explicit.  To the extent that the coefficients on the fixed effects 
differ from each other, they may indicate convergence toward different long-run 
steady-state levels of per capita GDP. 
 
When the countries are ordered according to the confidence intervals of 
the fixed effects coefficients, they appear to break into a number of semi-
overlapping groupings.  A statistical argument can be made that all counties in 
each grouping are converging toward the same level, but the levels differ across 
the groups  -- these would be so-called “convergence clubs” within Europe, 
along the lines that have been discussed in Quah (1993ab). 
 
On closer examination of the data, however, such a conclusion seems 
open to question.  Historically, levels of measured nominal per capita GDP have 
not remained neatly ordered across European countries according to the 
groupings suggested by the fixed effects coefficients.  The rankings are thus 
strongly influenced by the time period selected for analysis.  
 
The logical conclusion i s cautionary, warning against over-interpreting 
the fixed coefficients.  It should also be recognised that the fixed effects include 
institutional factors, and there is a trend toward convergence in these as well as 
Europe becomes an ever closer group of n ations.  With time-invarying 
regression coefficients, there will be a bias toward overemphasising initial 
conditions.  This is important to keep in mind as well when using the past to 
infer the future of the poorer accession countries. 
 
With regard to the  panel regressions on US and Canadian data, the 
region/province fixed effects were not significantly different from each other.  
This result was robust to every regression that was run.  Nonetheless, the 
inclusion in the regression of fixed effects substantially improved regression fit 
and increased the size of the coefficient showing speed of convergence.  